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Lessons Learned from a Major Near Miss: A Case Report Including
Recommendations to Improve Future Patient Safety in Rehabilitation
Abstract
Background: Most medical errors can be traced to system failure, but often individual providers are
blamed. Few articles in the allied health literature address the topic of error or the analysis of error using
a system approach. Purpose: This case report analysis illustrates how both individual and system factors
contribute to error in rehabilitation settings and how identification of these factors allows development of
methods to improve future patient safety. Case Description
Description: A young male was admitted to a rehabilitation
hospital with residual impairments following recent surgical resection of a benign meningioma. He was
treated daily by a physical therapist intern as part of a large interdisciplinary team. On separate occasions
over a three week span, the patient presented with isolated calf tightness, right-sided and central chest
pain, and fever with increased heart rate. Although the intern considered possible deep vein thrombosis
(DVT), each symptom was attributed to other causes by the intern, supervising physical therapist, physician
assistant, and/or physician (i.e. muscle fatigue, heartburn, infection). On day 22, the patient was diagnosed
with DVT and pulmonary embolism (PE). This event represents a major near miss due to the potential
deadly outcomes of a missed DVT/PE diagnosis. The intern retrospectively completed an analysis of
the event to identify contributing system factors. Outcome of Analysis: Active failures and latent system
conditions on multiple levels of the healthcare system were identified as contributors to the major near
miss. Discussion: The contributing factors identified in this paper are not unique to this case, intern, or
facility, and may be widespread across rehabilitation settings and practitioners. Team members can and
should consider how system-wide factors contribute to their own clinical actions and decisions. Once
factors are identified, strategies for reducing risk can be implemented; ultimately creating a culture of
safety.
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ABSTRACT
Background: Most medical errors can be traced to system failure, but often individual providers are blamed. Few articles in the
allied health literature address the topic of error or the analysis of error using a system approach. Purpose: This case report
analysis illustrates how both individual and system factors contribute to error in rehabilitation settings and how identification of
these factors allows development of methods to improve future patient safety. Case Description: A young male was admitted to
a rehabilitation hospital with residual impairments following recent surgical resection of a benign meningioma. He was treated daily
by a physical therapist intern as part of a large interdisciplinary team. On separate occasions over a three-week span, the patient
presented with isolated calf tightness, right-sided and central chest pain, and fever with increased heart rate. Although the intern
considered possible deep vein thrombosis (DVT), each symptom was attributed to other causes by the intern, supervising physical
therapist, physician assistant, and/or physician (i.e. muscle fatigue, heartburn, infection). On day 22, the patient was diagnosed
with DVT and pulmonary embolism (PE). This event represents a major near miss due to the potential deadly outcomes of a missed
DVT/PE diagnosis. The intern retrospectively completed an analysis of the event to identify contributing system factors. Outcome
of Analysis: Active failures and latent system conditions on multiple levels of the healthcare system were identified as contributors
to the major near miss. Discussion: The contributing factors identified in this paper are not unique to this case, intern, or facility,
and may be widespread across rehabilitation settings and practitioners. Team members can and should consider how systemwide factors contribute to their own clinical actions and decisions. Once factors are identified, strategies for reducing risk can be
implemented; ultimately creating a culture of safety.
BACKGROUND:
Error is inevitable in healthcare settings because of the complexity of the environment and the human fallibility of healthcare
providers. When medical error occurs, human tendency is to look for individuals to blame.1-3 However, most errors occur because
of a recurrent set of circumstances and system conditions rather than solely the error of one person.1,2,4 The Institute of Medicine’s
(IOM) To Err is Human attributes the majority of patient injuries to system failure. 1 The IOM’s Crossing the Quality Chasm, as
explained by Berwick, expands this concept by presenting four levels of the American healthcare system.5 (Figure 1) Factors at
any level may contribute to error at the level of the patient’s experience (Level A).5
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Figure 1. Summary of Berwick’s four levels of the American healthcare system which serves as the framework for the
Institute of Medicine’s Crossing the Quality Chiasm5

Therefore, analysis of patient harm resulting from error requires not only consideration of an individual provider’s actions but also
a broader approach with consideration of all system and environmental contributions to error. If contributing system factors are not
identified and corrected, the same conditions exist for the same error to occur again with other patients and/or providers. 2,4 A
system approach to error analysis recognizes error as the consequence of system factors.4 It emphasizes that all factors must be
considered before passing judgment on an individual provider. It recognizes that human error only results in an adverse event
when multiple layers of safeguards or barriers fail and allow the error to reach the patient. These barriers fail because of a
combination of two factors: active failures and latent conditions.4 Active failures are actions of providers who are in direct contact
with the patient and may include “slips, lapses, fumbles, mistakes, and procedural violations.”4 While active failures may
immediately affect the patient, sometimes the effect is delayed, and sometimes, the patient is never affected.1,3,4 Latent conditions
are organizational factors not in direct contact with the patient.3,4 Latent conditions create environments that propagate error (e.g.
fatigue, lack of training, productivity expectations, poor communication methods) and can also weaken safeguards against error.4
Latent conditions can lie dormant for long periods of time before combining with active failures and allowing adverse events to
occur.1,3,4
As illustrated in Figure 2, adverse events, as the result of active failures and latent conditions, occur on a continuum of harm
ranging from a minor near miss to a major event depending on the severity of harm that occurs.6 A facility is more likely to investigate
a catastrophic event compared to a potentially serious situation that is discovered and corrected before a major event occurs (a
major near miss).6,7 Yet, near misses occur more frequently than actual harmful events and should be investigated as warning
signs of future system failure.6
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Figure 2. Continuum of medical error and near miss based on the degree of harm caused by an event;
adapted from Ginsburg et al 6

While the incidence of adverse events and methods of error analysis and reduction have been researched in other areas of health
care such as medicine, nursing, and pharmacology, few studies address physical therapy error and the analysis of system
conditions in rehabilitation settings.8,9 Physical therapists may be less involved than other medical providers in error reduction
efforts because physical therapy is often perceived as a lower risk profession in that the errors made by therapists may be less
likely to be life-threatening.9 Therapists may also be hesitant to openly admit error due to the erroneous assumption that reporting
will automatically result in punishment or claims of malpractice.8,10,11 However, serious error can and does occur in physical
therapy.8
PURPOSE: This case report analysis illustrates how both individual and system factors contribute to error in a rehabilitation setting
and how identification of these factors allows development of methods to improve future patient safety.
CASE DESCRIPTION
This case occurred on the brain injury unit of a rehabilitation hospital in the United States. The unit had two interdisciplinary teams,
each named for the physiatrist leading the team. The teams were comprised of physicians, physician assistants, nurses, physical
therapists, occupational therapists, speech-language pathologists, pharmacists, neuropsychologists, and case managers.
Additional coverage staff as well as interns and students of all healthcare disciplines frequently joined and left the team. There was
no set combination of providers on each team beyond the physician, so typically no two patients shared the same combination of
providers. In this case, physical therapy was provided by a third year Doctor of Physical Therapy intern working under the direct
supervision of a physical therapist.
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Patients received therapy five days per week. Their care was divided according to each disciplines’ specialty area, and team
members met weekly to discuss evaluation results and progress. Each discipline documented weekly in an electronic medical
record (EMR) system, and the physician also handwrote notes and orders in a traditional paper chart stored on the unit.
The patient involved was a male in his thirties who was admitted to the hospital two weeks after the resection of a benign
meningioma and subsequent right intracranial bleed. The medical record stated that he had no significant past medical history
including no personal or family history of a clotting disorder. Vascular ultrasound assessments routinely performed upon admission
revealed superficial vein thrombosis (SVT) in his left forearm, but no signs of deep vein thrombosis (DVT). Signs of SVT and DVT
were not present in his other three extremities. The patient was not placed on DVT prophylaxis because he was mobile and at a
high risk of bleeding due to his recent intracranial bleed. Instead, he received 80 milligrams of aspirin daily.12 The physician cleared
the patient to participate in therapy with monitoring of his SVT. (See Figure 3 for a timeline of events occurring during the patient’s
rehabilitation stay.)
Figure 3. Timeline of Events

Consistent with the location of his brain injury, the patient presented with left hemiparesis. During ambulation, he required
assistance to maintain balance, had ataxia, and demonstrated significant gait deviations that worsened with fatigue. He was alert,
oriented, and demonstrated good communication and awareness of his safety and physical deficits. The speech-language
pathologist performed cognitive testing and reported that the patient only had mild impairments in processing speed and working
memory.
Seven days after admission, the patient reported left calf tightness while ambulating 150 meters. The physical therapist intern
considered the possibility of a DVT and determined the patient’s risk of clots by weighing the results of a clinical examination,
current medical management, and application of the Wells Criteria, a clinical prediction rule widely used to determine if referral for
further diagnostic testing is warranted.13 Examination revealed no swelling or tenderness in the lower extremity. Examination alone
has poor psychometric properties for the detection of DVT, but together with information from the medical history, examination
findings help determine a patient’s risk.13 Recent vascular assessments were negative, and he was on aspirin.12,13 Using the Wells
Criteria, the intern determined the patient had a moderate risk (17%) of DVT due to limb paresis and recent surgery. 13 After
discussion with her supervising therapist, the intern decided that an alternate diagnosis of muscle cramping was likely causing the
calf tightness because muscle fatigue had already been hypothesized as a contributor to the patient’s gait deviations. The patient
performed a standing calf stretch which resolved his symptoms. Three days later, left calf tightness returned, and again his
symptoms resolved with stretching. The intern documented these events in the physical therapy progress note.
During a mid-morning session five days later, the patient reported vague, right-sided and central chest pain lasting approximately
eight minutes while performing standing balance activities. Symptoms were not reproduced with deep breathing or active upper
extremity range of motion. The situation was discussed with the supervising therapist and physician assistant who attributed the
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symptoms to heartburn. The intern wondered about this diagnosis because the patient denied a history of reflux and because he
had not eaten within the past couple hours. However, neither the physical therapist nor physician assistant seemed concerned, so
the intern deferred to their assessment out of respect for their experience and areas of expertise. The intern documented the event
in the progress note but was not aware if the physician assistant also documented the event or informed the physician. The patient
denied chest pain in subsequent therapy sessions.
Four days later, the patient presented with fever, lethargy, and increased resting heart rate (120 bpm). The physician suspected
an infection and prescribed antibiotics. After three days without improvement, the physician referred the patient for further
diagnostic testing which revealed left proximal lower extremity DVT and right pulmonary embolism (PE). The patient was given
intravenous Heparin and two liters of continuous oxygen. The physician restricted ambulation for the next three days, consistent
with the traditional prescription for DVT to prevent the dislodgment of clots.14 The intern was curious about this order as current
research supports ambulation immediately to early (0-2 days) after a therapeutic level of anticoagulation is reached. 14 Early
ambulation has not been shown to increase the risk of new PE or extension of current DVT, and patients who ambulate early have
significantly reduced pain, swelling, and heaviness compared to patients placed on bed rest.14 However, the intern did not discuss
this order with the physician because she felt she could not immediately support her concerns with current evidence nor did she
feel comfortable challenging the experienced physician.
After his PE diagnosis, the patient told the intern and supervising therapist that he had a lower extremity DVT prior to his brain
tumor; important historical information because prior thromboembolism increases the risk of a subsequent clot.15,16 The intern
documented this missed information but did not verbally inform the team.
Left calf pain, shortness of breath, and decreased cardiovascular endurance were present from PE diagnosis through discharge.
Despite ongoing symptoms, rehabilitation goals were met, and he was discharged thirty-seven days after admission. He returned
to the same facility for outpatient therapy, and eventually his symptoms resolved.
REFLECTIONS ON THE CASE:
A three-week delay occurred between the patient’s initial symptoms and his DVT/PE diagnosis; a major near miss due to high risk
of death from PE. The healthcare team and patient were simply lucky, as an estimated 1 in 5 patients with PE die immediately
while an additional 40% die within 3 months.16 Because the patient recovered without serious injury, neither the intern nor
interdisciplinary team recognized the event as a significant medical error, and consequently, did not complete an error analysis.
The team may have discussed this case with the intent of determining if system factors beyond the innate difficulty of diagnosing
these conditions may have contributed to the delayed diagnosis. Identification of these factors could have allowed correction of
issues with the goal of preventing future patients from developing PEs. In fact, this case is ideal for learning because direct patient
harm was averted, and therefore, the tragedy, guilt, sadness, and risk of litigation are less than if the patient had died.6 The same
system conditions exist, but they can be examined with fewer emotional barriers.
The intern only recognized error when she retrospectively reflected on the patient’s care after completing her clinical experience
at the facility. She initially blamed herself, but upon further reflection and review of the literature on medical and system error, she
realized other factors might have contributed to the delayed diagnosis and near miss. She completed an analysis to identify
contributing factors on each level of the healthcare system (Figure 1).5 She utilized a Contributory Factors Checklist to help ensure
that factors at all levels of healthcare were considered.
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Table 1. Contributory Factors Checklist. Adapted from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI) 17 and from
Contributory Factors Framework in Root Cause Analysis-Application Guidelines.18
Patient Factors
Staff Factors
Team Factors
Clinical
Competence
Verbal communication
Pre-existing Co-morbidity
Inadequate Knowledge
Between professions
Difficulty in Diagnosis
Inadequate Skill/Experience
Outside of micro-work environment
Personal
Compliance
Inadequate delegation communication
Personality
Failure to comply with policy
Written Communication
Cultural or Religious beliefs
Intentional or unintentional violation
Incomplete/inadequate information
Social/Family Circumstances
Personal
Discrepancies in notes
Stress
Personality
Incomplete documentation
Disclosure of health history
Stress
Illegible charting
Interpersonal
Fatigue
Misinterpretation of information
Patient-Staff relationship
Distraction
Supervision and seeking help
Mental Impairment (e.g. illness, drugs, Unwillingness to seek help
pain)
Unavailability of staff to help
Specific illness (e.g. depression)
Responsiveness of staff to request for help
Domestic Issues
Inadequate delegation communication
Interpersonal
Congruency
Staff-patient relationship
Definition of tasks between professions
Staff-staff/team relationship
Definition of tasks within profession
Staff-organization relationship
Leadership
Ineffective leadership
Unclear definitions of responsibility
Staff/colleagues response to incidents
Inadequate support by peers after incident
Inadequate support by team members after
incident
Work/Care Environment
Management/
Task/Technology Factors
Building/Design
Organizational Factors
Availability of health information:
Inadequate equipment maintenance Leadership/Governance
Misinterpretation of information
Poor functionality (ergonomic Leadership presence
Availability/Reliability of information
design)
Leadership style
Hard to find information in EHR
Physical Environment
Resources/constraints
Task Design
Movement of patients between Human Resources
Ease of task execution
areas
Financial Resources
Design deficiency
Storage
Safety, Culture, Priorities
Inadequate space within rooms
Inadequate safety culture
External Factors
Information Technology
Wrong priorities
Political
Malfunction/reliability
Organizational Structure
Goals
Functionality of EHR
Hierarchical arrangement of staff
Perceptions
System Design/Access
Unclear roles/responsibilities
Economic
Staffing
Standardization of common processes Laws/Regulations
Unavailability
Authority gradient
Regulatory Requirements
Allocation of staff
Objectives, policies/standards
Partnership working with external
Recruitment
Operations
organizations
Education/Training
Human Resources Policies
Contractual arrangements
Orientation
Information Policies
Communication
Ongoing/refresher training
Risk Management process
Workload/Hours of work
Inadequate regular breaks
Heavy workload
Long working hours
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OUTCOME OF ANALYSIS:
Multiple system factors were identified as contributing to the delayed diagnosis of the patient’s DVT and PE. Key active failures
included 1) the interdisciplinary team did not identify a complete past medical history, 2) the intern, physician assistant, and
supervising physical therapist did not directly report the patient’s symptoms to the physician, leading the physician to make clinical
decisions without key information, 3) the intern did not seek clarification from the physician and physician assistant about their
clinical decisions, and 4) the intern did not use best interventions supported by research. Latent system conditions that contributed
to and combined with each of these active failures are summarized below:
Several latent conditions were identified as contributors to the team’s failure to learn about the patient’s history of DVT (See
subcategories of Table 1)17,18 This team typically worked with patients who had decreased ability to communicate, which combined
with the trauma and complexity of the situation, made accurate identification and verification of information difficult. Therefore, the
team relied on the accuracy of the historical record of past treating institutions (Task/Technology Factors, External Factors). The
team did not recognize and utilize this patient’s “unique” ability to verify his medical history (Patient Factors). Finally, beyond
performing ultrasound assessments, the facility did not utilize a standardized set of questions or process to screen for DVT or other
common complications (Management/Organizational Factors).
The cause of the patient’s calf tightness cannot be definitely known, but in retrospect, the intern should have directly informed the
physician because the patient’s medical condition, including his current SVT, automatically increased his risk of DVT. 15,16,19
However, latent conditions including the weekly occurrence of rounds (Team Factors), high reliance on verbal communication
(Team Factors), challenging EMR design (Task/Technology Factors), and poor daily communication methods (Team Factors) also
contributed to the physician not knowing about the symptoms. No formal methods of daily communication were available beyond
reporting in weekly rounds or physically locating the physician for a conversation. By the time rounds occurred several days after
the patient’s symptoms resolved, the intern had other, more current information to report. Because each disciplines’ notes were
written weekly and were not easily accessible to other members of the team, the physician likely never saw the documentation of
calf tightness or chest pain. The physician may not have known about the symptoms experienced by the patient because of limited
bi-directional communication amongst team members. Effective communication between team members requires a balance of
both verbal and written communication. Alone, verbal communication is prone to information loss due to interruptions, fatigue, or
boredom, and typically, verbal interaction occurs between a few people while the rest of the team remains uninformed. 9,20,21
Similarly, solely relying on written documentation can also lead to missed information as EMR systems often contain large amounts
of information, making it difficult to find the most critical and pertinent information during a chart review.
Latent conditions also contributed to the intern’s failure to seek clarification about the medical team’s decisions which then led to
the failure to use the best interventions following thrombotic complications. The physician was designated as the leader of the team
by the facility, and therefore, was automatically placed in a position of authority (Management/Organizational Factors). Additionally,
the team consisted of professionals who were highly skilled in their areas of specialization. These factors created perceived
authority gradients between disciplines. An authority gradient is defined as “the balance of decision-making power or the steepness
of command hierarchy in a given situation.”22 As a result of the authority gradients, the intern, and likely other team members, did
not challenge or seek clarification from the leader or other colleagues because of feeling that the experience and knowledge of
other providers should be respected.22,23 These gradients can also create an overreliance on other team members to monitor and
treat a particular body system.
Finally, an important latent condition was the presence of the intern under the supervision of a licensed physical therapist (Staff
Factor). Due to limited clinical experience, the intern did not yet have a strong professional identity and was at times uncertain if
her level of concern was appropriate. The intern’s automatic first step in any questionable situation was to discuss the issue with
her supervisor. On a positive side, this discussion creates another protective layer against error. However, interns may actually
have more information about recent literature, but because of perceived inferiority of knowledge and experience, may not act on
what they think is best and instead use their supervisors’ responses to decide if their concern is justified. 22
The analysis also identified what system factors worked well. In other words, what “defenses” or “safeguards” stopped the
sequence of events from resulting in permanent harm or death.4 While luck was involved, other factors such as the facilities’ ability
to quickly and efficiently coordinate medical imaging with a neighboring facility (External Factor), the physician’s experience and
response with correct medication management once the DVT and PE were identified (Staff Factor), and the physician’s efficient
communication with the nursing staff and pharmacist to ensure appropriate adminstration of anticoagulation medications (Team
Factor) all contributed to a successful outcome.
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DISCUSSION
An analysis of this case led to identification of both individual and system factors that contributed to this major near miss,
demonstrating that physical therapists and other allied health professionals can and should consider how systemic factors
contribute to their own clinical actions and decisions. Professional autonomy brings with it the responsibility to consider all risk
factors and to advocate for patient safety.8 When individuals and facilities acknowledge that error is inevitable and not isolated to
the actions of one person, a shift can begin to occur from blaming individuals to reporting, analyzing, and learning from mistakes.8,10
The issues identified in this case analysis are not unique to this intern or facility. A qualitative study identified common errors made
by physical therapists (3-39 years of practice) across multiple clinical settings.8 The common active failures included failure of the
therapist to communicate in a confident manner and to share information with other providers; failure to demonstrate professional
autonomy and acknowledge responsibility for physical therapy issues; and implementation of physician’s orders when evidence
supports other more effective interventions.8 The qualitative study, along with other studies in the medical literature, identified latent
conditions including barriers to accessing medical records; lack of methods that support timely and effective communication; the
presence of authority gradients; and lack of skills needed to initiate conversations about patient safety.1,8,9,20,23-25 Additional factors
related to healthcare interns included concerns over being negatively evaluated, difficulty finding appropriate words to express
concern, high regard for the instructor-intern relationship, and respect for the instructor’s experience.23,24
Prevention of Future Error
Methods of remediating the specific active failures and latent conditions in this case are cited in the medical literature and may be
applied in the case.1,5,8,9,20,21,24-30 To our knowledge, no studies published within the physical therapy literature investigate the
effectiveness of these interventions at reducing error.
a. Changes to Team Dynamics and Communication (Level B)
To ensure effective collaboration, medical teams should be trained to work together.1 Formal teamwork training programs, such
as TeamSTEPPS, teach groups to develop an attitude of “looking out for each other.”1,11,26,27 This training educates team members
about their roles and encourages disciplines to proactively cross-check each other’s work, seeking solutions to patient safety issues
together without compromising the strong knowledge base of individual disciplines.1,26 Ideally, all members join the team and are
trained at the same time in order to maximize collaboration and develop common goals and vision. 27 If other individuals
intermittently join the team, active processes must be in place to ensure that new staff understands their responsibilities and current
team procedures. Institutions should also consider how frequent team variability potentially weakens effective teamwork and
creates system vulnerability.27
Leaders can reduce authority gradients by encouraging members to voice their opinions and by sharing past experiences in which
they made poor clinical decisions.1,5,24 These admissions help new, inexperienced team members understand that everyone is
vulnerable to error.8,24 Facilities and teams should consider if the same person (in this case the physician) should always be
designated as the leader or if this structure inherently creates an authority gradient. Rather, should circumstances and patientneed dictate the leader of the team?
Methods to improve communication and lower the rate of adverse events include brief daily rounds (sometimes called “lightning
rounds”) to discuss new developments and immediate concerns while saving in-depth discussions for weekly planning meetings;
structured communication protocols for daily rounds (e.g. SBAR); and development of an EMR system with easier access to
documentation and pop-up notifications to support verbal communication and alert the entire team of new issues. 20,21,27-29
The importance of the patient and family in error reduction is often underappreciated.1,9,30 If the situation is appropriate, patients
and caregivers should be educated about the symptoms of potential complications and empowered to speak up if they are
concerned.30
b. Changes to Facility Operations (Level C)
Standardized protocols and checklists are used in aviation to ensure safety of passengers, while surgical teams utilize protocols
no matter how many times they have performed a procedure in order to ensure safety of patients.3,9,31 Interdisciplinary teams may
similarly benefit from use of protocols for the screening, identification, and management of high risk issues and complications that
frequently occur in their patient population. When all team members are responsible for following a protocol, the risk of error is
greatly reduced and blame is removed from one team member.3,31
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c. Changes to Entry-Level and Continuing Physical Therapy Education (Level D)
The concepts of active failure and latent conditions should be formally included in physical therapist education.23,25 A study
examining the attitudes and behaviors of fourth year medical students suggests that without formal education, the majority of
students lack the confidence and skills to report errors appropriately and to seek clarification from their instructors.25 Within physical
therapist education, interns and students need opportunities to practice formal communication methods in both clinical and
simulated environments.23-25 Faculty and clinical educators also need to be educated about responding appropriately to inquiries
from their students, modeling correct behaviors, and demonstrating that despite their position of seniority, they still value and
respect the contributions of their students.25
It is important to include experienced clinicians in education and training about error reduction processes. The skill of recognizing,
reporting, and preventing error can be developed through simulations and case discussions. Purposeful analysis of actual error
has a greater impact for learning than general discussion of error. With practice, therapists gain the confidence to demonstrate
professional autonomy and help change system contributions to error.8
CONCLUSION:
In this rehabilitation case example, individual mistakes and system factors on several levels of the healthcare system were identified
as contributors to the adverse event. The medical literature and the few physical therapy papers on this topic propose similar
common contributors to error, suggesting that these factors are not unique to this case. Physical therapists, as members of wider
healthcare teams, are obligated to improve patient safety by applying current knowledge of common errors and developing formal
error reduction processes within their practice settings.
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